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There is an old saying that Finland is an island. This statement is still very true as about 80 
percent of the Finnish foreign trade takes place by sea. In order to make a container 
shipment an empty container is required which – if not available – needs to be repositioned 
to the export location. The repositioning helps to absorb the transport imbalance by moving 
empty containers from surplus to deficit areas. The aim of this thesis is to find and analyze 
reasons to the shortage of export containers in Finland, propose a solution to the situation 
and to raise awareness of other emerging risks. The research is an action research where 
the primary sources of information were interviews, personal knowledge and observation. 
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discusses how the market influences the shipping industry and what risk mitigation actions 
the shipping industry has taken in order to run a successful business. The research shows 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a general background of container shipping industry. It also 
introduces the research aims and objectives, the research method and outline of the thesis.  
1.1 Background 
Historically most of the globally transported goods have been shipped by sea. Today it is 
generally accepted that more than 90 percent of global trade is carried by sea. (Maritime 
Knowledge Center p. 7) 
 
Maritime shipping represents the most ancient global transportation, holding a unique 
role in geographical discovery, communication of cultures and development of economy 
throughout history (Yang, X.J. et al 2011 p.3). After World War II, the trade liberalization 
led to increased participation from developed and developing countries in international 
trade and drove the growth of maritime shipping. Globalization in the 1990s then brought 
about a large expansion of world trade and shipping (Yang, X.J. et al 2011 p.7). 
  
Notteboom writes how the container shipping has a rather short history as the first 
container ship Ideal X was launched in 1956. The development was fast because of the 
adoption of standard container sizes in the mid-1960s. Also the industry players were well 
aware of the advantages and cost savings coming from faster vessel turnaround times in 
ports, a reduction in the level of damages and associated insurance fees, and integration 
with inland transport modes such as trucks, barges and trains (Notteboom 2012 p. 230 f.). 
Yap describes in his doctoral thesis how later the growth of containerization kept its pace 
thanks to developments in container-handling technology and supply chain management 
which made consolidation and distribution of merchandise products regular, reliable, 
efficient and safe. The developments enabled the costs to be kept down, global sourcing 
and distribution patterns to be developed and sustained and led to the increasing 
penetration of containerization across different trade routes. There are some grounds e.g. 
port congestion, trade imbalances, environmental constraints, rising oil prices and 
complex security issues that could add risk to the supply chain and thereby diminish the 
rate of growth for containerized shipping (Yap, W 2009 p. 3&29). 
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According to Notteboom the container shipping industry consists of shipping companies 
whose core activity is transportation of containerized goods over sea via regular liner 
services. A liner service is “a fleet of ships, with a common ownership or management, 
which provide a fixed service, at regular intervals, between named ports, and offer 
transport to any goods in the catchment area served by those ports and ready for transit 
by their sailing dates” (Notteboom 2012 p. 230). Figure 1 shows the 2007 global shipping 
routes based on actual itineraries. It reveals that the largest trades are on the East -West 
routes: Transpacific, Transatlantic, Europe - Far East, Europe - Mid East, North America 
- Mid East, and Far East - Mid East. These routes provide employment for over half of 
the container ship capacity and uses the biggest container ships (Stopford M 2009 p. 524 
ff.).  
 
Figure 1. Map of global shipping routes based on actual itineraries (Kaluza et al. 2010) 
Container liner services are specifically focused on the transport of a limited range of 
standardized unit loads: the twenty-foot dry-cargo container or TEU and the forty-foot 
dry-cargo container or FEU. Increasingly, slightly diverging container units are also 
loaded on container vessels, such as tank, open-top, flat rack containers and 45foot 
containers. Break Bulk is non-containerized cargo that needs to be shipped on multiple 
flat rack containers put together to accommodate the very large size or weight (Maersk 
Line). Container shipping can be characterized as a business with customers who have 
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generally different transport requirements and it involves carrying a wide variety of goods 
e.g. consumer items, industrial products, foodstuff, and even agricultural commodities 
and primary produce (Yap, W 2009 p. 25). 
 
The growth of container shipping has been remarkable. The global container traffic, the 
absolute number of containers being carried by sea, increased from 28.7 million TEU in 
1990 to 152 million TEU in 2008 or an average annual increase of 9.5 per cent (Ducruet 
& Notteboom p.2). Shipping is not immune to economic downturns. In 2009 when the 
world witnessed the worst global recession in over seven decades and the sharpest decline 
in the volume of global merchandise trade, international seaborne trade volumes 
contracted by 4,5 percent. However seaborne trade bounced back in 2010 and grew by an 
estimated 7 percent (Maritime knowledge center p. 7). Global container traffic grew by 
4,6 percent in 2013 taking total volumes to 160  million TEUs (UNCTAD p.7). Wolff et 
al writes how trade in Europe has been strongly influenced by containerization for the 
past decades. In 2007 and 2008 the development reached its peak to date with a turnover 
of circa 70 million TEU in European ports. The containerization has been particularly 
strong in the Baltic Sea Region exceeding the EU average. One reason has been the 
growing demand for containerized goods in Russia. Furthermore traditional bulk and 
break bulk cargo such as pulp, paper and sawn wood have moved to containers in Finland 
and Sweden. (Wolff, Herz & Flämig, 2011, p 3-4) 
 
Figure 2. Global containerized trade, 1996-2014 (UNCTAD p.17) 
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1.2 Purpose of the study 
Since the beginning of 1990’s Finland has enjoyed an easy access to export containers 
thanks to the Russian imports. However, today container shipping line representatives in 
Finland are in a situation where there are only few containers available for export 
customers. The purpose of the study is to find out why there are so few containers 
available. 
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to answer the question “Why so few containers?”. The research 
objectives are:  
(i) find and analyze reasons to the shortage of containers in Finland 
(ii) propose a solution to the situation  
(iii) raise awareness of other emerging risks  
 
The subject is close to heart for the author as she has been working in the shipping 
industry for almost a decade. Starting with a few years in customer service with a RoRo 
shipping line before moving to customer service with a container liner agency and later 
on to sales. The limited amount of containers in Finland affect the author’s everyday job 
very much as the lack of containers creates challenges to fulfill the sales targets.  
1.4 Research methods 
This research is done as an action research. McNiff & Whitehead describes action 
research as a way to investigate and evaluate one’s own work by asking “What am I 
doing? What do I need to improve? How do I improve it?”. Distinctive for action research 
is that it is all done by practitioners themselves rather than a professional researcher who 
does research on practitioners. Action researchers sees themselves as a part of the 
situation they investigate (McNiff & Whitehead 2006 p.7). According to McNiff & 
Whitehead traditional researchers tend to believe that knowledge is certain and assume 
there is an answer to everything. Action researchers tend to assume 
 there is no single answer; a question may have many answers 
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 knowledge is created usually with a process of trial and error and the answer and 
process are always open to critic 
 any answer is tentative and open to modification. 
Action researchers do not look for a fixed outcome that can be applied everywhere, but 
rather produce their personal theories to show what they are learning and to invite others 
to learn with them. (McNiff & Whitehead 2006 p. 27 ff.) 
 
Action research is often done in a cyclic process. There are many ways of describing the 
cycles. Kemmis and McTaggart, for example, describe each as having four elements: 
plan, act, observe and reflect. The important characteristic of each cycle is that the 
researcher plans before acting, and reflects on the findings and the method after acting. 
There are cycles within cycles: if one is using interviews for data collection, each 
interview is a cycle. The sequence of interviews forms another cycle, as do the other 
forms of data-collection one uses. In turn, they are part of the still larger cycle of the 
overall project. (Dick 1995 p. 5 ff.)  
The stages in this research are: 
 The first step in the process was to formulate a broad question to identify the 
problem: “Why so few containers?” The following step was to decide who to ask, 
and how to ask them. (This step is “plan”.) 
 A study of the relevant literature of container shipping and risk management in 
container shipping was executed. To learn more about the container situation in 
Finland today a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted. (This is the 
“act” component.) Semi-structured interviewing is guided only by an interview 
guide that provides a framework for the interview (Gillham 2005 p. 70 ff). 
 The information collected was then checked and interpreted. At that time a 
reflection of the adequacy of participants and the way of collecting information 
took place. (These steps are part of reflection.) 
The action research method is best suited for this study because the author is in the middle 
of this situation at work. Studying what can be done to improve the situation may also 
improve the likelihoods of reaching sales goals. To ensure reasonable validity and 
reliability, action researchers should avoid relying on any single source of data. It is 
recommended that researchers use a process called triangulation to enhance the validity 
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and reliability of their findings. Essentially, triangulation means using multiple 
independent sources of data to answer one's questions. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis includes five chapters. The rest of the thesis is organized in the following way. 
Chapter two continues the literature review and describes what risks are and what kind of 
market risks there are in container shipping - then moving on to risk management and risk 
mitigation strategies in container shipping. In chapter three there is a more detailed 
description of the current container availability situation in Finland and how it emerged. 
There is also a suggestion what can be done to mitigate the problem. Finally a look into 
the future and what emerging risks can be seen for the container shipping in Finland. 
Chapter four is a summary and a discussion of the findings and chapter five has 
conclusions and recommendations. 
1.6 Study limitations 
There are numerous different kind of risks in shipping: maritime safety, cargo safety, 
accidents in the workplace, natural disasters, legal risks, business practices, failures in 
projects, credit risk or the security and storage of data and records. These are too many 
and too far apart topics to discuss in one thesis. Therefore the literature review for this 
study is limited to market risk in shipping and risk mitigation strategies from a financial 
point of view. The scope of the study is the current export container availability in Finnish 
ports and how the situation emerged.  
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2 MARKET RISKS IN CONTAINER SHIPPING 
2.1 What is a risk? 
Risks are a part of our lives. We make choices every day without knowing if the choice 
will have a positive or negative outcome. It is an unstructured activity based on common 
sense, related knowledge, experience and instinct. (Kuusela & Ollikainen p. 16 f.)  
 
Merna & Al-Thani writes about the origin of the word “risk”. It is thought to have its 
origin in either the Arabic word risq or the Latin word riscum. The Arabic risq meaning 
“anything that has been given to you (by God) and from which you draw profit” and 
suggesting a positive outcome. The Latin riscum initially referred to the challenge a 
barrier reef is to a sailor and implies either a fortunate or unfortunate end (Merna & Al-
Thani 2005 p. 9). Cleary & Mallaret points out that today most Western minds think risk 
means exposure to danger or hazard but for example the Chinese symbol for risk is 
composed of the symbol for threat and opportunity. A possible outcome of a risk is a 
reward. (Cleary & Mallaret 2007 p. xiii). Rausand is defines a risk as a future potential 
event that is possible to analyze and manage. (Rausand. M, 2011 p. 3-5) 
 
Ilmonen et al explains how an overall risk management in the business world aims at 
identifying, evaluating, prioritizing and controlling the risks hindering a company 
reaching its goals. By categorizing risks they will be more commensurate and they can be 
better compared. Categorizing risks also raises risk awareness in the company and 
improves the understanding of the relation between the risks. One of the most common 
ways of categorizing risks is to set them in four types: strategic, financial, operative and 
accident risks as shown in Figure 3. The risks are categorized by source and type. The 
source can be internal (e.g. related to the organizations internal operations, events or 
choices) or external (e.g. clients, markets, legislation). (Ilmonen, I et al., 2013 p. 64) 
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Strategic risks Financial risks Operative risks Accidental risk 
1. 
Risks related to  
business development 1. Liquidity risk 1. 
Risks related to 
the organization and 
management 1. 
Risks related to 
occupational health and 
safety at work 
2. 
Risks related to  
business environment 2. Interest risk 2. 
Risks related to 
information 
technology 2. Human resource risk 
3. Market risk 3. Currency risk 3. 
Risks related to 
information security 3. Environmental risk 
4. Technology risk 4. Counterparty risk 4. 
Risks related to 
production, operation 
process and efficiency 4. Damage risk 
5. 
Risks related to political,  
economic and cultural 
development 5. Country risk 5. 
Risks related to 
business interruption 5. 
Risks related to 
natural disaster 
6. Regulatory risks 6. Contract risk 6. Productivity risk 6. 
Risks related to 
operational safety 
7. 
Risks related to  
global phenomenon (e.g. 
climate, environment) 7. Tax risk 7. 
Risks related to 
project activities     
8. 
Risks related to  
communication 8. 
Risks related to  
accounting and 
financial reporting 8. 
Contract and  
responsibility risk     
9. 
Risks related to 
 merger and acquisition 9. 
Risks related to 
capital structure 9. 
Risks related to 
crisis situations     
        10. Criminal risk     
 
Figure 3. Risk categories (Ilmonen, I et al., 2013 p. 64) 
 
Ilmonen et al elaborates how strategic risks are the risks involved in a company’s long 
term strategic goals. When planning an organizations five year strategic goals there are 
numerous internal and external uncertainty factors to consider. External factors could be 
changes in the business environment, customer behavior, regulatory changes and new 
technology. Internal factors could be that the development portfolio, product or service 
range does not support the strategic goals, a lack of knowledge in the crucial business 
areas or inability to recognize the customers’ needs. Risks related to merger and fusion 
are crucial internal strategic risks. Fusions, mergers and outsourcing an activity are almost 
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without exception very complicated change management projects. Nevertheless a lost 
business opportunity is also a risk. Financial risks are risks threatening the company’s 
monetary process such as a customer’s inability to pay his debt leading to a cash flow 
problem for the company. Operative risks are the direct and indirect risks in a company’s 
daily operations. They could come from insufficient or unsuccessful internal processes, 
human resources, systems or external events. Accidental risks are usually best perceived 
because they are most familiar to the general public. Many of the risks in different 
categories are very similar and can be consequences of the same event but on different 
levels e.g. strategic and operative. Categorizing risks will facilitate the analysis of the 
risks and the detection of interrelations between risks. (Ilmonen, I et al., 2013 p. 66-69) 
2.2 Market risks in container shipping 
A general definition of a market risk is: market risk is the exposure to potential loss that 
would result from changes in market prices or rates (Lam 2014 p. 209 ff & FINRA). 
Shipping has made and destroyed millionaires over the years. Rates and prices in shipping 
industry are changing in cycles. Shipping markets can be characterized as being capital 
intensive, cyclical, volatile, and seasonal, while shipping companies are exposed to the 
international business environment (Kavussanos & Visvikis 2006 p. 233 ff). 
 
Figure 4 shows the basic elements of the business model of the container liner industry, 
according to Stopford, with the market place for container transport in the center and the 
competitive process divided into two parts. Part (a) describes the market variables which 
set the tone of the market in which the container companies operate and identifies three 
factors which determine the market environment: the degree of rivalry between the liner 
companies, barrier to entry and the availability of substitutes such as air freight. Part (b) 
is concerned with strategic variables over which container companies have some 
influence: the bargaining power with suppliers, the bargaining power with customers, and 
the extent to which the company can differentiate its services and strengths in competitive 
position. (Stopford 2009 p. 535 f) 
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Figure 4. Liner industry business model (Stopford 2009 p. 535) 
 
Both Stopford and Konsta write about shipping cycles. The shipping cycle is an economic 
concept that explains how shipping companies and freight charges respond to supply and 
demand. There are four distinctive stages in shipping cycles: a market trough is followed 
by a recovery leading to a market peak, followed by a collapse. An example is showed in 
Figure 5. In the trough stage there is a surplus of shipping capacity and freight rates fall 
to operating costs, the long continued low freight rates and light credit create negative 
cash flow. In the recovery stage there is a balance of supply and demand leading to an 
increase in freight rates towards operation costs. There are fewer laid-up ships and the 
order books are increasing. In the peak stage demand meets supply and freight rates are 
two or three times higher than operating costs. Ship-owners become very liquid and keen 
to lend, public floatation of shipping companies and the order books expand. In the 
collapse stage the demand of shipping services is lower than the supply of ships and the 
freights fall, liquidity remains high, vessels are laid up. A market can collapse due to 
business cycles, global economy and financial crisis. There is no simple formula to predict 
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the next stage or the next cycle. Troughs may last six months or six years, peaks may last 
a month or a year and sometimes the market can get stuck in the middle between trough 
and recession (Konsta 2014 p.27-30 & Stopford 2009 p. 96 ff.). One of the toughest risks 
to manage in container shipping is the market risk. A statistician at the British Chamber 
of Shipping called Isserlis was the first to thoroughly analyze the shipping market. He 
analyzed rates from 1869-1936 based on a carefully constructed rate index. His 
conclusions on the predictability of rates remain true today: “The fact remains that it is 
comparatively easy to find explanations for the various stages of a trade cycle that is past, 
and that it is impossible to predict correctly the occurrence of the successive phases of a 
cycle which is in progress, and still more so in the case of a cycle that has yet to 
commence” (Heaver 2012 p 19 ff). 
 
 
Figure 5. Stages in a typical dry cargo shipping market cycle (Stopford 2009 p. 97)) 
 
Rodrigue argues that since containerization is simultaneously a technological and a 
management practice, it has a life cycle. Which means there are phases of introduction, 
followed by growth which is usually followed by a phase of maturity where a paradigm 
reaches its optimal market potential and thus its growth rate slows down significantly. 
There is increasing evidence that containerization is entering a phase of maturity, 
implying that its future growth potential is more limited and likely linked to niche market 
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opportunities. (Rodrigue 2010 p. 17) Notteboom and Rodrigue et al agrees that the only 
additional demand can come from low value products which will only be shipped 
overseas if freight rates are very low (e.g. the market for waste paper and metal scrap). 
These temporary markets tend to disappear once the freight rate is above a threshold level 
no longer allowing a profit on trading these products overseas. (Notteboom 2012 p. 238-
241 & Rodrigue, Comtois, Slack 2013) 
 
 
Figure 6. Global container port throughput, 1980-2008, and projection scenarios for 2015 (Rodrigue 2010 p. 17) 
Rodrigue explains in Figure 6 that the shape of the growth curve leads to assume that 
future throughput would follow the reference scenario, which expects traffic to double 
between 2005 and 2015. Such a perception prevailed within the industry up to late 2008. 
The maturity scenario shows that throughput would be leveling off by 2015. It assumes 
that the process of globalization slows down and that most comparative advantages in 
manufacturing have been exploited. The global recession scenario is reflecting the 
financial crisis that began to unfold in 2008 and it takes into account the global recession 
impacting international trade and consequently the container flows. (Rodrigue 2010 p. 
17) 
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The changes in the global GDP and exports and imports affect shipping demand and flow 
of traffic. Shipping is hit among the first industries when an economic downturn start 
(Lorange & Fjeldstad 2012 p. 263 ff). This is why economists are looking at the maritime 
trade for information about the health of the global economy and where it’s headed 
(VanderMey 2014). The high level of freight rate volatility means that shipping is 
perceived as a high risk industry by investors and lenders. Shipping is a very dynamic 
industry with strong up and down movements, high profits and remarkable losses. The 
shipping market depends on variables that affect demand and supply. Demand is affected 
by world economy, seaborne commodity trades, average haul, politics, and transport 
costs. Supply again is affected by the world fleet, fleet production, shipbuilding 
production, scrapping and losses and freight rates (Konsta 2014 p.24-27 & Lorange & 
Fjeldstad 2012 p. 263 ff). Most industries can distinguish between business risk and 
market risk, shipping belongs to the industries that cannot distinguish between the two. 
Financial results in shipping are directly affected by movements in the world’s freight 
rate market. One could claim ship-owners are in the business of managing shipping risks 
affecting a portfolio of physical assets, rather than simply managing a fleet of vessels 
(FreightMetrics slide 16). 
 
Stopford points out how managers of container liner companies are “between a rock and 
a hard place” in trying to meet varying needs of a varied customer base whilst operating 
regular schedules with relatively inflexible strings and at the same time cover a sizable 
administrative cost. It is to produce volatile revenues in free market trade cycles, seasonal 
cycles and trade imbalances while living with a volatile cash flow (Stopford 2009 p. 556 
f). 
2.3 Risk management 
According to Ilmonen et al the aims of risk management are to secure the continuation of 
a company’s activities, to protect the investments made in it and to fulfill the required rate 
of return. Business is always about taking risks. The owners are willingly taking a risk 
when starting a business i.e. investing their own wealth in the company and accepting the 
possibility of losing it. The management might not risk losing their own wealth but they 
put their job on the line when making big decisions. Thus the owners and the management 
19 
 
have a joint interest to agree on rules for business risks. When the rules have been set, the 
actual risk management can begin. Risk management is directly linked to the company’s 
strategy and values, it is not a disconnected process or a separate procedure. Even social 
values from outside the company can effect risk management. For example a very low 
tolerance for risks towards children must be taken into consideration if the company 
produces children’s’ toys. In a dynamic ever-changing world also the risk management is 
dynamic. For instance if the ownership of the company changes its values, thus effecting 
the risk management. 
 (Ilmonen, J et al, 2013 p. 30-31)  
 
For Aven a risk analysis is a systematic use of available information to identify initializing 
events and to draw the contributing and consequence picture. A risk analysis is always 
proactive as it looks only at potential future events.  One analyses risks to establish a risk 
picture like Figure 7 which is a simplified bow-tie model. (Aven T, 2008 p. 3-4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Simplified bow-tie model (Rausand. M, 2011 p. 6) 
 
Rausand defines risk analysis to be an answer to three questions: 1) What can go wrong? 
2) What is the likelihood of that happening? 3) What are the consequences? (Rausand. 
M, 2011 p. 33-37). When risk analysis is completed a risk evaluation takes place. Risk 
evaluation is a process where judgements are made on the tolerability of the risks from a 
risk analysis. Rausand strongly recommends that the risk analyst is also involved in the 
risk evaluation in order to avoid errors and communication problems.  When risk analysis 
and risk evaluation are conducted in a joint process it is called a risk assessment. Then 
adding identification and implementation of risk-reducing actions and a follow up on how 
the risks change over time one, is conducting risk management as illustrated in Figure 8 
(Rausand. M, 2011 p. 7-12). 
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Figure 8. Risk analysis, evaluation, assessment and management (Rausand. M, 2011 p. 10) 
2.4 Risk mitigation strategies in container shipping 
Part of a formal risk assessment process according to Marchetti involves ranking risks 
based on impact and the likelihood of occurrence. To begin the risks will be placed into 
one of four risk response categories. These categories are: 
1. Risk avoidance. If an activity has a high likelihood of loss and significant financial 
impact, it is usually recommended to completely avoid the activity.  
2.  Risk acceptance. Management accepts certain risks because it operates a business.  
3.  Risk mitigation. “Mitigation” by definition involves minimizing risk. Therefore, if 
management determines that a risk should be mitigated, it is looking for a solution that 
will reduce either the likelihood or the impact of that incident or event. In other words, 
management is seeking to limit exposure. This response includes management control 
systems to reduce the risk of loss.  
4.  Risk transfer. This solution involves moving risk from one entity to another. It often 
means movement of a risk to an external party, but it may also result in shifting risk to a 
different part of the same entity or subsidiary. The two most common forms of risk 
Risk management 
Risk analysis 
- Identify hazard and threat  
- Identify hazardous events 
-Determine frequencies and 
consequences 
-Establish risk picture 
 
Risk evaluation 
-Evaluate risk (against risk 
acceptance criteria) 
- Propose risk-reducing 
measures 
- Assess alternative risk- 
reducing measures 
Risk control 
- Make decisions related to risk-
reducing measures 
- Implement measures 
- Monitor effects 
- Communicate risk 
Risk assessment 
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transfer include the purchase of various types of insurance and derivative product 
transactions, such as futures or options. (Marchetti 2012 p. 29 ff) 
Chang describes characteristics of container shipping to be following: 
Container shipping 
 needs huge capital investment 
 is easily impacted by global economy 
 earns unstable income which is impacted by world fuel price and exchange rate 
 is limited by inflexible supply of container ships 
 is impacted by the degree of government support 
 has fixed freight, which is because of the upward trend in sizes of container ships 
 has to bear the cost of empty container transportation 
 has to follow international regulations 
From the characteristics above one can draw the conclusion that container shipping is 
associated with a wide range of risk sources in a complex international environment. 
Container shipping is often a part of a longer supply chain where other parties are 
involved including consignee, consignor, ports, terminal operators, agencies, inland 
transportation haulers and forwarders. The operations within and between the parties and 
the long physical distance may generate various risks. (Chang, C-H p.2-3) 
 
The mandatory components of risk assessment management in shipping according to 
Konsta relate to the following:  
 International Safety Management Code Implicit. The purpose of the ISM Code is 
to provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of 
ships and for pollution prevention. 
 European Union regulations 
 IMO – International Maritime Organization. The most important conventions 
being: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto and by the Protocol of 
1997(MARPOL), International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) as amended, including the 
1995 and 2010 Manila Amendments 
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 Flag requirements. Flag states have certain rules and requirements for vessels that 
fly their flags. Major requirements include crew nationality, crew composition, 
ship owner citizenship and ship building requirements. 
 Industry Best Practice e.g. TMSA (Tanker Management and Self-Assessment) 
Once risks are identified a plan to minimize or eliminate the impact of negative events 
will be created. Common risks that are possible to eliminate are for example accidents in 
the workplace or fire, tornadoes, earthquakes and other natural disasters. It can also 
include legal risks like fraud, theft and sexual harassment lawsuits. Risks can also relate 
to business practices, uncertainty in financial markets, failures in projects, credit risk, or 
the security and storage of data and records. (Konsta 2014 p.35-42) 
 
The container market has been challenged by structural changes within the industry: 
mergers and acquisitions, increasing concentration, and changes in regulation, among 
others by banning the conference system in Europe. Container shipping companies are 
also exposed to a variety of risks such as the long term business cycle, high seasonal 
variability, trade imbalances, and highly variable bunker fuel costs. Within this 
environment, container shipping companies have to manage the operational inflexibility 
of service offerings that require high levels of fixed cost, while offering what many 
shippers perceive as a standardized service. (Kang et al. 2015) 
 
The shipping business requires huge amounts of capital investment because of high levels 
of fixed cost. Shipping companies that used to, before the financial crisis 2009, rely 
greatly on banks for capital now experience funding difficulty. The large capital 
investment may still be available to varying degrees by financing through shipping 
commercial banks. Recently shipping companies have increasingly entered stock markets 
as an alternative source of finance to avoid too much debt exposure. The shipping industry 
is highly capital intensive and is exposed to multiple financial and operating risks rising 
from the volatility in interest rates, currency exchange, operating expenses and vessel 
charter rates. Shipping companies today not only need to achieve better performance, in 
order to attract investors, but also are obligated to provide shareholders meaningful 
information for their decision making. One of the motives of shipping companies is to 
continuously search for competitive advantage through improved performance through 
financial risk strategies and operational choices such as ship size, age, and ownership. 
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Financial risks in the shipping industry are broadly categorized as liquidity, default, 
financial, credit and market risks. Liquidity risk refers to how easily a firm can turn its 
assets into cash. Default risk refers to the possibility that a firm will not be able to make 
payments to honor its obligations on time. Financial risk refers to how dependent a firm 
is on borrowing or financial leverage. Credit risk predicts whether the counterparties of 
business will fulfill their agreement. Market risk emphasizes the impact of a company’s 
performance on the rest of the stock market. Shipping companies can manage their risk-
taking behavior through risk assessment tools and financing/investment decision 
involved. (Kang et al. 2015 & Wang et al. 2014 & Albertijn et al. 2011) 
 
Notteboom writes how in the container shipping industry some assets are owned and 
others leased and there is a wide variability in cost bases. To be successful a container 
liner needs to have a good asset management. Common asset management decisions for 
shipping lines include management of the equipment to reduce downtime and operating 
costs, increase the useful service life and outstanding value of vessels, increase equipment 
safety and reduce potential liabilities, and reduce costs through better capacity 
management. Fleet capacity management is challenging because of the inflexible nature 
of vessel capacity in the short run due to fixed timetables, seasonality effects and cargo 
imbalance on trade routes. Container shipping lines also have to make large investments 
in their container fleet. (Notteboom 2012 p. 233-238) 
 
Ng identifies three major trends to find cost savings can be seen in the recent development 
in container shipping industry: economies of scale, re-structuring and differentiation. By 
the turn of the century the development of mega-sized vessels had become a common 
practice among major shipping lines. Figure 9 shows the evolution of the largest 
containerships: from 4538 TEU in 1988 to 18270 TEU in 2013. The size has quadrupled 
during past 25 years. (Ng 2012 p.7) 
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Figure 9. Evolution of the largest containerships: 1988-2013 (Alphaliner) 
 
Rodrigue et al explain how larger containerships have lower operating costs, often 
measured as the cost per TEU per day. Depending on the distances at which containers 
are carried this will result in different total shipping costs. The Singapore - Rotterdam 
route is often used as a frame of reference in container shipping costs. Figure 10 assumes 
normal operating speeds and shows that through the recognized principle of economies 
of scale, operating costs per TEU are reduced with the usage of larger ship classes 
(Rodrigue, Comtois, Slack. 2013). 
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Figure 10. Daily Operating Expenses for Containerships per TEU (Rodrigue, Comtois, Slack. 2013) 
 
The global economic downturn in 2008 hit the shipping industry hard and shipping lines 
were struggling to gather enough cargo to fill up mega-sized vessels. During this time the 
global container carrying capacity fell 15 percent and different measures were 
implemented to reduce operational costs such as re-routing, withdrawal of services from 
certain markets, and laying up vessels. Part of the overcapacity could be used when 
shipping lines started slow steaming (Ng 2012 p.9 & Notteboom p.242 ff). Malonia et al 
clarifies full speed for a container ship might typically be 24 knots (generally 85 - 90 
percent of engine capacity). Reducing vessel speed to 21 knots represents slow steaming 
with 18 knots defined as extra slow and 15 knots as super slow. Fuel can exceed half of 
overall operating costs for container ships, and consequently, changes in fuel prices will 
have significant impacts on per TEU transport costs. By slow steaming the shipping lines 
could make considerable savings. Another slow steaming benefit, is that the reduced fuel 
consumption directly corresponds with lower levels of greenhouse gas emissions, namely 
CO2. Reduced vessel speeds and longer transit times also enable greater carrier flexibility 
to adjust speeds to overcome delays, allowing better schedule timeliness (Malonia et al. 
2013). Wackett points out there was a demand from shippers to stop slow steaming when 
the oil price dropped dramatically in 2014, but it is not something shipping lines plan to 
do. The change in speed would require fundamental changes in shipping lines’ networks 
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and be costly and complex. Also around seven percent of the world’s container fleet are 
employed due to the requirement for extra ships in service loops to compensate for longer 
transit times (Wackett 2015). 
 
Strengthening the scale of operation, the container shipping industry also saw some 
horizontal integration which included acquisitions, mergers and the establishment of 
strategic shipping alliances. Figure 11 illustrates the alliances in July 2015. The 
advantages for rationalization were the protection of market shares, cost reduction 
through slot re-arrangements, better market perception through efficient information 
exchange, opportunities to enter new markets, wider geographical coverage, new 
technologies and stronger bargaining position against ports. Through the rationalization 
measures shipping lines aimed at increasing control in the decision-making process, 
combining financial power to expand and sharing of financial risks. (Ng 2012 p.12 & 
Notteboom p.251 ff) 
 
 
Figure 11. Container shipping line alliances in July 2015 
 
The economic crisis late 2008 seemed to have increased diversity among the shipping 
lines’ long term strategies. Some shipping lines decided to focus on the core business of 
liner shipping e.g. Hapag-Lloyd. Some shipping lines like APL, NYK and OOCL 
established logistical branches, or fully owned logistics subsidiaries, with the aim to 
provide a total logistical solutions to their customers. Japanese and Korean lines 
increasingly rely on their roles within large shipping conglomerates for example NYK 
and MOL have only 40 percent of their business in shipping thus spreading the risk (Ng 
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2012 p.13 f & Notteboom p.255 ff). Maersk Line tried to offer a differentiated product, 
by giving to customers guaranteed delivery times in return for higher freight rates and 
Daily Maersk was launched in September 2011. Daily cut-offs were offered, meaning that 
cargo could be shipped immediately after production without the need for storage, with 
Maersk Line promising agreed pick-up times and offering compensation, should 
customers’ containers not arrive on time. Daily Maersk was withdrawn in the beginning 
of 2015 due to customers were not willing to pay a higher price for better service. This 
reflects the fact that the big east-west trades have become highly commoditized, with 
lines finding it almost impossible to offer a differentiated product on these routes (Porter 
2015c).The success of the different strategies depend on how the shipping lines overcome 
some difficulties, including whether additional savings could cover the extra costs 
triggered, possible reduction in flexibility due to higher switching costs, the possibility of 
longer and more complicated decision-making process, and the possible organizational 
complexity and different management cultures between different firms and transport 
modes (Ng 2012 p.13 f & Notteboom p.255 ff).  
 
Despite challenging times and low freight rates, Baker writes the first quarter 2015 was 
the most profitable in four years with an estimated operating margin of eight percent. 
However the average unit revenue was down six percent year on year and the unit cost 
fell by eleven percent. Offsetting the decline in revenue per TEU is the falling oil price 
that will bring down operating costs for the carriers. A total of 37 ships of 13800 - 20000 
TEU have been delivered so far in 2015, all of which have been deployed to the Far East 
- North Europe route. Another 13 ships within this size range are due to be delivered by 
December, all bound for the same trade. The pressure to fill those new ships and maintain 
market share will continue to squeeze freight rates through the remainder of the year 
(Baker 2015). For the first six months 2015 Maersk Line’s profits were up 22 percent at 
$1,2 billion, while return on invested capital reached 12,2 percent. “I am satisfied with 
our first half-year result and return on invested capital. Our strong financial performance 
is the result of our cost leadership strategy. It has proven to be the right strategy, especially 
at a time with very tough competition, falling rates and stagnating demand,” Maersk Line 
chief executive Søren Skou says (Maersk Line). With the general trend in rates continuing 
to be down, Maersk is focusing instead on cost reduction. To gain economies of scale the 
line has ordered a new series of Triple-E ships for the Far East - Europe trade. Maersk 
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Line’s $220 million increase in first-half profits was achieved through lower costs and 
despite a fall in average freight rates of 8,1 percent compared with the opening six months 
of 2014. A 42 percent reduction in bunker costs down to an average $335 per ton and the 
appreciation of the US dollar against most of the currencies where ship disbursements are 
paid were the main reasons for the positive result (Porter 2015a). 
 
Figure 12 shows how there has been several attempts by container shipping lines to 
implement general rate increases (GRI) throughout 2015 but they have all failed. Due to 
the low global fuel prices and oversupply of vessel capacity (vessel utilization was 
approximately 90 percent in Q2 2015) shipping companies have found it difficult to 
justify rate increases (Nightingale 2015b). Hapag-Lloyd CEO Rolf Habben Jansen 
describes in August 2015 several positive indicators within the next 18 months: all four 
major shipping line alliances have now announced that they will pull capacity from the 
routes between the Far East and Europe, and a general increase in the volume of scrapped 
vessels following the opening of the new and expanded Panama Canal in 2016. Almost 
overnight the Panamax class of container ships, 20 percent of the fleet, will become 
unnecessary: not just because of their size, but also their design, which will make them 
unprofitable (Andersen 2015b). The average fleet in Asia – Australia trade has been 4300 
TEU for years. This might change in 2016 when a new container port in Melbourn is 
opened. The new port can handle vessels of 8000 TEU while today the five largest 
container ports can currently handle ships of max 5500 TEU. The advantages of 
upgrading to bigger ships from Asia to Australia relate to bunker consumption, which 
would decline by close to 30 percent, according to the SeaIntel analyst agency's 
calculations. (Raun 2015) 
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Figure 12. The World Container Index describes the container freight rates from actual market prices. 
(http://ciw.drewry.co.uk/)  
 
The core of the problem in the container shipping industry identified by Notteboom is in 
a combination of the capital-intensive operations and high risks associated with the 
revenues due to a combination of volatile markets and inflexible capacity in the short run. 
On top of this, the pricing strategies of container lines have only a marginal impact on 
total trade volumes. The particularities of the market have urged shipping lines to develop 
capacity management strategies aimed at reducing the cost per TEU carried. Shocks in 
demand due to global economy in combination with the vessel order strategies of shipping 
lines mean that the container shipping industry regularly faces long periods of vessel 
oversupply and rate erosion. Capacity management proves to be a very difficult issue in 
periods of shrinking demand, as the carriers which decide to cut capacity might see other 
shipping lines freeriding on the resulting rate restoration. The economic crisis challenges 
shipping lines to carry out a comprehensive review of their business models. Recent 
declines in global trade and container flows were unprecedented. Shipping lines incurred 
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massive losses and have no other option than to seek recovery in total revenue streams up 
to a level where carriers may achieve mid-cycle margins and returns. Rate restoration will 
remain vulnerable as long as postponed deliveries and idle ships are not fully absorbed 
by growth in demand. (Notteboom 2012 p. 259-260) 
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3 SHORTAGE OF CONTAINERS 
3.1 Introduction 
Figure 13 demonstrates a basic container flow by Ng: after vessel arrival laden containers 
are picked up by importers and emptied and returned. This has to be done during the 
agreed free unloading time or demurrage and/or detention charges will arise. Once back 
in the depot the empty container must be surveyed and repaired before it can be released 
to an exporter. If the damage to the container is extensive and it is located in a country 
with high labor cost it is likely to be moved empty to a low labor cost, export oriented 
country e.g. from USA to China (Ng, A S-F 2012 p.34).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Basic container flow (Ng, A S-F 2012 p.34) 
 
The total number of containers around the world increased from 16 million TEUs in 2001 
to 27,1 million TEUs in 2009 (Ng, A S-F 2012 p.30). And according to the World 
Shipping Council the fleet was approximately 34,5 million TEU in 2013. As a rule of 
thumb each TEU of container ship capacity requires three additional container units – one 
for each end of the landside calls and one for the sea voyage. However, the container-to-
slot operating ratio is today closer to 2:1 as carriers cut their capital expenditure. 
Container shipping lines and container leasing companies spent about $4,2 billion on new 
containers in 2014, an increase of 13 percent on the previous year, but still some 35 
percent down on the 2011 spending. Approximately 1,6 million TEU are added to the 
container fleet each year with the container lease industry accounting for most expansion 
and container shipping lines ordering a minority share of new containers (Barnard 2015). 
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In 2014 approximately $10 billion was spent on new containership orders totaling 1,06 
million TEU worth of capacity. Maersk Line signed in July a $1,1 billion order for nine 
14000 teu vessels as part of Maersk Line’s USD 15 billion investment in new-buildings, 
retrofitting, containers and other equipment. (Container Insight 2015b). 
 
Affordable and efficient international container shipping enable companies to set up their 
manufacturing plants in countries where the labor cost is low and the overall business 
environment is more favorable for manufacturing. Subsequently some countries, 
particularly developing countries in Asia, become the world’s manufacturing centers. The 
imports of these countries are mainly raw materials, which are commonly transported as 
bulk cargo while the exports is manufactured products in containers. The manufactured 
products are shipped to major consumption markets such as America and Europe (Ng, A 
S-F 2012 p.31 ff) 
 
 
Figure 14. Estimated containerized cargo flows on major East–West container trade routes, 2009–2013 (Millions of 
TEUs) (UNCTAD p.18) 
 
Figure 14 shows cargo flows in the world’s three main East - West container trade routes, 
which link the industrial Asia with North America and Europe. In the Transpacific route 
there were 13,8 million TEUs shipped eastward in 2013 whereas there were only half of 
the volume, 7,4 million TEUs, shipped westward. A similar trend can be seen in the Asia–
Europe route; there were 14,1 million TEUs moving from Asia to Europe, compared with 
only 6,4 million TEUs moving from Europe to Asia, in 2013 (UNCTAD p.18). Europe 
can also be a surplus area but for different container types and in other seasons e.g. reefers 
in citrus season (Flapper, van Nunen, Van Wassenhove p. 65). In order to make a 
container shipment an empty container is required which – if not available – needs to be 
repositioned to the export location. The repositioning helps to absorb the transport 
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imbalance by moving empty containers from surplus to deficit areas. As can be 
understood from cargo flows in Figure 14 the amount of empty repositioning is 
substantial: every fifth seaborne container and 40 percent of all containers transported 
over land are empty (Jahn, C et al 2014 p.502). Carriers had a cost of USD 16 billion in 
2011 empty logistics which equals to 15 percent of operating expenses (Rodrigue, 
Comtois, Slack 2013). Container repositioning is a complex problem and it is hard for 
container lines to achieve cost minimization and profit maximization. The need to 
reposition empty containers globally increases the inventory and operational cost to the 
shipping lines, and raises their working capital due to a larger investment in containers. 
Ng describes how shipping lines reduce the impact of empty container repositioning by 
improving their liner network design and vessel fleet size planning at the strategic level 
and on the landside container dispatching and global empty container repositioning at the 
operational level. Shipping lines also use solutions that involve other parties, including 
collaboration with other supply chain partners, deployment of innovative technology such 
as foldable containers, and investigation of new markets for empty containers. (Ng 2012 
p. 45 ff)  
3.2 Description of the current container situation in Finland 
There is an old saying that Finland is an island. This statement is still very true as about 
80 percent of the Finnish foreign trade takes place by sea. The shipments related to 
Finnish foreign trade plummeted in 2009 and recovered only in 2013. The Russian 
economy and the traffic flow to and from Russia affect greatly also the volumes to and 
from Finland as some of the Russian shipments are shipped thru Finnish ports. (Ministry 
of Transport and Communications, Transport Policy Department 2014 p. 2&10) 
 
Baltic container ports are almost exclusively served by feeders and not directly connected 
with deep sea ports. This is the hub-and-spoke network where deep sea cargo is 
transshipped in hub ports in Belgium, the Netherlands or Germany. (Wolff, Herz & 
Flämig, 2011, p 11 f) 
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In order to find out what is the current container situation in Finland a series of interviews 
took place. The interviewees were: 
 Mr. Tapio Mattila, Senior Vice President Marketing and Sales at Steveco. Steveco 
produces, among other, stevedoring services in Helsinki and Kotka port. 
 Mr. Tommi Sievers, Sales and Marketing Manager at Port Of HaminaKotka Ltd 
 Mr. Taneli Antikainen, Senior Transport Economist at the Finnish Transport 
Agency 
 Mrs. Outi Nietola, Logistics Manager at Finnish Forest Industries Federation 
(FFIF). The value of forest industry exports accounted for approximately 20 
percent of all Finnish exports. 90 percent of Finnish forest industry products are 
exported and 90 percent of them by sea. 
 Mr. Janne Raappana, General Manager of Sales for Finland and Baltics at 
Unifeeder A/S. Unifeeder is a logistics company with the largest feeder and 
shortsea network in Northern Europe. 
 Mrs. Reetta Tiittanen, Sea freight Manager at Kuehne + Nagel Finland. Kuehne + 
Nagel International AG is a global transportation and logistics company. 
 Mr. Michael Enberg, Managing Director at Maersk Finland Oy. Maersk Line is 
today the world’s largest container shipping company. Maersk Line is a part of 
the Maersk Group, headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark and had a revenue of 
USD 47 billion in 2013. 
 
There were some variation in the answers. According to Mr. Mattila (Steveco) there was 
at the time of the interview in June a lack of some 2000-4000 export containers per month. 
Mrs. Nietola (FFIF) was reading minutes from a workshop she lead a few years ago and 
at that time no participants had mentioned a shortage of export containers in Southern 
Finland but the participants had expressed a shortage in Northern Finland’s ports. Mrs. 
Tiittanen (Kuehne + Nagel) said there had been a period from April to June when there 
had been a lack of export container from ocean carriers but the problems had faded by 
August. Mrs. Nietola (FFIF) questioned whether a lack of containers would be something 
the FFIF members would report to the federation as it’s mainly linked to the member 
organizations’ own operations. Mr. Raappana (Unifeeder) says they have not noticed a 
big lack of export containers in their shortsea traffic and Mrs. Tiittanen (Kuehne + Nagel) 
confirms the same. Mr. Antikainen (Finnish Transport Agency) said he had heard there 
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is currently a lack of export containers in Finland. The Finnish export volumes have been 
as long as Mr. Enberg (Maersk) can remember greater than the import volumes. The 
Finnish import volumes have not changed notably in the past years but the Finnish export 
volumes have increased some like shown in Figure 17. The demand for export containers 
in Finland was catered during 2010-2014 with empty positioning from Russian ports in 
Saint Petersburg area. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) explains that the shipping lines operating 
their own feeder traffic could optimize the cargo flows and create cost savings by routing 
laden containers from a hub port in Europe to Saint Petersburg, in Saint Petersburg load 
the feeder vessel with empty containers to KotkaHamina, and fill up the feeder with laden 
containers from KotkaHamina back to the European hub port. At the time there was barely 
no export out of Saint Petersburg so the feeder vessels would have had to come to Finland 
anyway to pick up laden containers. The shipping lines could calculate a zero cost for the 
empty positioning from Saint Petersburg to KotkaHamina.  In 2015 the importing to 
Russia vanished almost overnight. Thus according to Mr. Enberg (Maersk) the export 
container availability in September is feeble but under control.  
 
Mr. Antikainen (Finnish Transport Agency), as well as Mrs. Nietola (FFIF), talked about 
the imbalance of import and export between different ports in Finland. Figure 15 
demonstrates how HaminaKotka port has a larger export in full containers than import 
and is forced to import empty containers in order to satisfy the exporters’ needs. In Figure 
17 we can see HaminaKotka port has over 40 000 TEU in empty imports in January-April 
2015 while the port’s total empty imports was a little over 80 000 TEU in a full year of 
2014. If the current situation continues, empty container import in HaminaKotka will 
increase by 50 percent. Port of Helsinki’s full import and export is almost in balance. Port 
of Rauma’s full import is less than a third of what the full export requires. There is no 
certainty that the full import will be of the container type the export requires, though Mr. 
Enberg (Maersk) says Helsinki does today receive from its own import approximately the 
containers needed for export. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) points out that Helsinki to this day 
has differentiated from the other ports in not having the forestry industry shipping out of 
Helsinki. This will however change in 2017 when the Äänekoski pulp factory will start 
operations. The pulp mill’s estimated containerized export volumes are 31000 TEU per 
year, increasing Port of Helsinki’s container volumes with a total of 62000 TEU 
(Tervonen, Juha 2015).  
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Jussi Sarvika, SVP Logistics at UPM-Kymmene Oyj, voices the need to reduce the 
amount of ports along the Finnish coast. The decreased cargo flows cannot endure higher 
costs if the Finnish exporters wish to stay competitive in the global market (Arola 2015). 
Mr. Enberg (Maersk) sees the future of Finnish ports in a similar way: shipping lines are 
constantly looking for ways of diminishing costs and one way is to call fewer ports with 
larger vessels. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) points out that all Finnish container traffic could 
volume vise be handled in Helsinki and HaminaKotka ports. Mrs. Nietola (FFIF) pointed 
out the lack of export containers in Northern Finland. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) suggests these 
cargoes could also be handled through Southern Finland ports if only the rail connection 
would be priced reasonably. Today some large exporters in forestry and mining industry 
have to keep requesting empty export containers to Northern Finland in order to keep cost 
under control.  
 
 
Figure 15. Container movements in main container ports in Finland 2014 (Finnish Transport Agency statistics) 
 
Mr. Mattila (Steveco) and Mr. Antikainen (Finnish Transport Agency) drew parallels 
between today and the beginning of 1990’s when the Russian transito shipments begun. 
Mr. Enberg (Maersk) explained even before the Russian transito traffic the Finnish 
container export was larger than the import and there was a constant empty container flow 
from Germany to Finland. When the Russian transito volumes started flowing thru 
Finland there was no longer a need to position empty containers from the European 
continent. At the same time the Finnish industry started to ship more in containers. The 
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Russian transito flows subsided during the economic crises in 2009 and since then the 
containers have been empty positioned from Saint Petersburg. In Figure 17 can be seen 
the increase of empty units brought into HaminaKotka port. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) goes 
on saying he now uses the term “old normal” to describe the situation today. Mr. Mattila 
(Steveco) pondered if this is actually the standard and the period from beginning 1990s 
until 2014 was a richness.  
 
The financial impact of the situation is significant. Mr. Mattila tells Steveco faces heavy 
direct financial impacts as an estimated 45 percent of the normal volume is missing. The 
containers unloaded in HaminaKotka port with final destination in Russia brings in 
significant amount of Steveco’s revenue. They are also paying a higher terminal handling 
charge and more yard rent than most full export containers. Steveco’s work force is 
calculated according to previous year’s volumes and the work force cost is some 40 
percent of the turnover. According to Mr. Sievers (Port Of HaminaKotka) there is a risk 
of the Finnish exporters losing their market shares to competitors due to not being able to 
deliver products according to agreed schedule, and the loss will affect the entire Finnish 
economy. Mr. Antikainen (Finnish Transport Agency) and Mrs. Nietola (FFIF) find there 
will be increases in costs for looking for alternative logistics solutions. Mrs Tiittanen 
(Kuehne + Nagel) confirms their clients, the real exporters, suffered from higher costs, 
especially in quarter two 2015, as Kuehne + Nagel had to book the containers with 
shipping lines with whom they do not  have negotiated special freights. Some ocean 
shipping lines debited additional surcharges such as peak season and equipment 
imbalance surcharge. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) explains these are surcharges some shipping 
lines, Maersk excluded, debited to cover costs from positioning empty containers to 
Finland. The surcharges could only be added on the spot bookings, not to annual 
contracts. The situation also caused delays in shipments and the real exporters were 
according to Mrs. Tiittanen (Kuehne + Nagel) concerned their clients would change to 
suppliers located closer. The situation caused additional work also for Kuehne + Nagel’s 
export department as they had to turn every stone to find empty containers for their 
customers. The task was not made easier by ocean shipping lines informing in the last 
minute that they actually did not have the promised containers available. Mr. Enberg 
(Maersk) describes how Maersk Finland had to absorb substantial costs from using extra 
loaders to bring in empty containers from United Kingdom in order not to violate annual 
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contracts. He further figures the Finnish exporter might have had to pay a higher freight 
rate, received some penalties if the shipment was delayed and in such cases also storage 
costs at the port might have arisen. The container situation remains unbalanced so Maersk 
Finland will have to continue to absorb costs in order not to violate annual contracts. Mr. 
Enberg (Maersk) says the cost for bringing an empty container from Bremerhaven with a 
commercial feeder such as Unifeeder costs approximately USD 150 excluding the lift to 
and from the vessel.  
 
Most of the Finnish imports in 2014 originated in Europe as Figure 16 demonstrates. 
According to Mr. Enberg (Maersk) some 75 percent of Maersk Finland’s import volumes 
originate in the Far East. The other trades e.g. the Americas, Europe, Middle East or 
Africa, are two to ten percent each. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) confirms most of the Russian 
import to Saint Petersburg are originating also from the Far East. It means whatever 
happens on the Far East – North Europe trade has a great significance for the Finnish 
container situation. 
 
Figure 16. Imports by group of countries to Finland 2014 (Finnish Customs) 
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Figure 17. Container volumes 2010-2015 (Finnish Transport agency, Maersk Line Russia, Maersk Line Poland, Port 
of Tallinn, Port of Hamburg, Port of Bremerhaven, Port of Riga.) 
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3.3 How did the situation emerge? 
In chapter two it was argued that the demand for shipping services derives from the global 
economic growth and from the need to carry international trade. In 2009 the global 
economy was in the midst of its deepest and most widespread recession in the post-war 
era. The EU economy was not spared. The intensification of the financial crisis in the 
autumn of 2008 prompted a global economic downturn which, in turn, further weakened 
the financial sector. Ambitious policy actions were taken by governments and central 
banks to prevent a systemic financial meltdown (European Commission 2009 p.1). In 
2009 the international seaborne trade volumes contracted by 4,5 percent as Figure 2 (page 
9) well illustrates. In spring 2010 recovery was underway in the EU, even if a gradual 
one. Real GDP started to grow again in the third quarter of 2009 ending the longest and 
deepest recession in the EU's history (European Commission 2010 p.1). In spring 2011 
the economic recovery in the EU continued to make headway, despite persistent volatility 
and tensions in financial markets and the emergence of new risks that have made the 
external environment more challenging (European Commission 2011 p.1). After the 
recession that marked the year 2012, the EU economy stabilized slowly in the course of 
the first half of 2013 (European Commission 2013 p.1 f). Growth turned positive in a 
large majority of Member States over the course of 2013 and the outlook improved even 
in the more vulnerable ones (European Commission 2014 p.1 f). In spring 2015 the 
outlook for the EU economy looked brighter than it had at any time since the deep 
economic and financial crisis of 2008-09. The recovery from the crisis and the double-
dip recession were long and tiresome, marked by numerous setbacks, but in May 2015 
there were clear indications that a cyclical upswing is underway, supported by economic 
tailwinds. (European Commission 2015 p. 9) 
 
The Far East - Europe container volumes have remained below 2014 volumes from 
January to April 2015 with a 3,4 percent fall with a drop of 22 percent year on year in 
March. The bend in February – March is a usual slowdown post-Chinese New Year 
(Nightingale 2015a). Only three countries in North Europe in April imported more goods 
from Asia than they did a year ago and these were the very marginal markets of Iceland, 
Ireland and Hungary (Container Insight 2015a). 
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Figure 18. Real GDP, EU (European Commission 2015 p. 9) 
 
The Russian economy and the traffic flow to and from Russia effect greatly also volumes 
to and from Finland as some of the Russian shipments are shipped thru Finnish ports. 
(Ministry of Transport and Communications, Transport Policy Department 2014 p. 2&10) 
Russian economic growth has slowed for three years in a row, due to declining growth in 
the available labor force, capital and productivity. In addition, a decline in export prices, 
the Ukraine crisis, US and EU sanctions, Russia’s counter-sanctions and increase in 
uncertainty, slowed Russian GDP growth to just over half a percent in 2014. According 
to a forecast by the Bank of Finland, Russian GDP will contract by over four percent in 
2015. Russian exports should benefit from a recovery in world trade but will increase 
only very slowly. Energy exports, in particular, which constitute over 60 percent of total 
export income, will remain relatively unchanged according to estimates by the Russian 
authorities. The weakness of the ruble may bolster exports of some basic goods as long 
as there is capacity. Import volumes declined by seven percent in 2014 and have now 
been in decline for one and a half years. Russian imports is estimated to fall by a fifth in 
2015, partly dragged down by the economic contraction. Figure 19 shows how import 
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volumes declined by 30 percent when GDP fell by eight percent during the recession of 
2009. Today the real exchange rate of the ruble has depreciated much more than in 2009: 
it is a quarter weaker than the average rate for 2014. In 2016–2017, global economic 
growth and world trade is estimated to pick up, and it is assumed the oil price will rise 
some. The Russian economy is expected to continue slightly downward, before a slow 
recovery in 2017. Export volumes will grow at a very subdued pace and imports are 
expected to recover after 2016. (Bank of Finland 2015) 
 
Figure 19. Russia export and import in USD (Andersen 2015) 
 
Container volumes at the Russian national seaports plummeted 20 percent year-over-year 
between January and April compared to the same period in 2014. Saint Petersburg, which 
handled nearly half of the country’s maritime container volume, suffered the biggest 
decline when traffic fell 28.2 percent year-over-year to 431,000 TEUs (Gerden 2015a). 
The much weakened ruble and the imposition of trade sanctions have heavily impacted 
on consumer spending in the country. Russia’s main import commodities in 2014 were 
capital goods such as machinery, electronic equipment, vehicles, clothing, foodstuffs and 
pharmaceuticals (Gerden 2015a). Russia is not usually considered one of the key markets 
in the Far East – Europe trade – in 2014 its imports accounted for only six and a half 
percent of the overall volumes – but since the trade now lost the 50000 TEU or so between 
January and March the overall results for the first quarter showed no growth for container 
shipping lines (Container Insight 2015a). Containerization level remains very low in 
Russia: 42 TEUs per thousand capita in 2013, compared to 135 TEUs in Europe and 90 
TEUs world average (Global Ports 2014). There is significant potential for further 
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containerization in Russian export flows (Global Ports 2014). In a case where Russia’s 
containerized export continues to grow and utilize the containers available from imports 
there will be no containers available for empty positioning to Finland. 
 
Mr. Mattila (Steveco) and Mrs. Tiittanen (Kuehne + Nagel) talk about the increased 
Russian container exports as a result of the weak ruble especially commodities like paper, 
plywood, ferroalloys, metal, fertilizers. As can be seen in Figure 17 the Saint Petersburg 
full import is over 13 000 TEU less than the export. In 2014 the full export was over  
100 000 TEU less than the full import and in 2013 the gap was over 240 000. The past 
years container shipping lines could cost-effectively move empty containers from Saint 
Petersburg to Helsinki and HaminaKotka ports to fulfill the Finnish export customers’ 
needs. Today this is not an option as there are no empty containers available in Saint 
Petersburg (Mattila 2015, Antikainen 2015, Raappana 2015, Enberg 2015). Mr. Mattila 
(Steveco) further goes on explaining that the Finnish exporters are now in competition 
with the Russian exporters who might get empty containers from mainland Europe. 
Chernov writes in his article “Playing with boxes” how the Euro's devaluation against the 
dollar (20 percent within a short period) boosted exports from Northern Europe and 
increased the demand for export containers. Finnish and Russian ports are in the end of 
the container ‘queue’ them being at the end of a feeder link. This situation causes 
imminent growth of export freight rates. Porter writes in her article “Russian exporters 
running on empty” that the annual growth in Russian containerized export was in the end 
of August some one to two percent but in the summer months the export volumes had 
seen a surge, with growth levels nearer annual rates of ten to fifteen percent. Porter goes 
on describing an unforeseen scene where export freights from Russia are higher than 
import freights to Russia. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) confirms it used to be so that import 
freights on Far East – North Europe route were three to four times the export freights. In 
2015 the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index has seen its lowest ever level and the 
import and export freight level are almost the same to/from Finland.  
 
Mrs. Tiittanen (Kuehne + Nagel) had been told the container shipping lines had moved a 
large portion of the empty containers to Far East in the beginning of 2015 in order to 
fulfill the needs of peaks season exports. However the peak season rush never came at the 
end of February and so Central Europe saw a lack of export containers in April, May and  
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Mr. Enberg (Maersk) does not believe the US West Coast port congestion (originating in 
contract negotiations between dockworkers and port management) had a significant, if 
any, impact on the container availability in North Europe.  
3.4 What can be done to mitigate the problem? 
When asking the interviewees how the container shortage problem could be solved most 
suggested alternative ways of shipping. Mr. Sievers (Port Of HaminaKotka) considers 
RoRo (=Roll-on/roll-off) or LoLo (=Lift-on/lift-off) shipments. Mr. Mattila (Steveco), 
Mr. Antikainen (Finnish Transport Agency) converses about moving cargo shipped in 
containers to break bulk ships (ship designed to carry packaged un-unitized shipments of 
all shapes, sizes, and weights). The challenge with break bulk ships is the availability of 
the right kind e.g. with ice classification, the amount delivered at once (25-45 thousand 
tons), the discharge port, the on-carriage to the final destination and to find some cargo 
to bring back to Europe. Mrs. Nietola (FFIF) tells how Finnish sawmills have for years 
played with the idea of shared sailings. This would mean a number of shippers, who 
cannot necessarily fill a break bulk ship on their own would together charter a break bulk 
ship to deliver their goods. Mrs. Nietola’s (FFIF) personal opinion is that in such a case 
the cargo should be exported from a limited amount of ports. Mr. Mattila (Steveco), Mrs. 
Nietola (FFIF) and Mrs. Tiittanen (Kuehne + Nagel) explicates that one solution could be 
to truck the products to Central-European ports, stuff them into containers there and then 
ship overseas. The challenge here is to find a cost effective way of doing it as it could 
easily multiply the loading costs. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) makes plain that the most cost 
efficient way of shipping is with a container from a Finnish port to a destination port and 
is a preferred mode of shipment amongst large exporters. Exporters will use other options 
e.g. break bulk when containers are not available. Some 25 percent of pulp is shipped 
today from Finland to China with break bulk vessels and paper to Philadelphia has been 
traditionally shipped break bulk. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) points out that the plan to truck 
cargo down to European main ports would require that there would be containers 
available, which was not the case this spring. 
 
Mr. Mattila (Steveco) and Mr. Raappana (Unifeeder) both bring up the empty positioning 
option: to bring in empty containers from other nearby ports. This is also the solution Mr. 
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Enberg (Maersk) believes in. Mr. Mattila (Steveco) even suggests to bring an ocean vessel 
full of empty containers directly from the Far East. According to Mrs. Tiittanen (Kuehne 
+ Nagel) ocean shipping lines brought in empty containers from Central Europe, the 
United Kingdom, even from the United States and Far East. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) 
confirms Maersk Finland also moved empty containers from all nearby ports where some 
were available and had to use extra loaders to bring empty containers from Felixstow in 
United Kingdom. 
 
One of Mr. Mattila’s (Steveco) suggestions is for container shipping lines to open a 
discussion with main exporters in Finland whether it would be possible to make an 
agreement where the liner would supply empty containers for a freight rate that would 
make the extra service interesting for the shipping line. For a shipping line this is a balance 
between service and costs like Mr. Raappana (Unifeeder) explains: on one hand the 
container liners strive to offer a good service to customers but on the other hand they must 
look at the costs linked to the empty positioning such as handling and transshipping at the 
terminal, empty warehousing while waiting to be repositioned, maritime repositioning 
and the cost of not being able to use the container. Mr. Enberg (Maersk) agrees with Mr. 
Raappana (Unifeeder) and speaks about the constant negotiation he has with the 
customers what is the freight level all parties can operate with.  
 
There is no certain answer when the container situation will be back to normal, if ever. 
The Bank of Finland forecasts the Russian import to recover after 2016 but at the same 
time the sanctions are assumed to remain unchanged for a relatively long period. 
Containerization in Russian export can grow and leave no containers available to be 
moved empty to Finland. 
3.5 What future emerging risks are there? 
Mr. Mattila (Steveco) expresses his concern that forestry industry would move their 
production to other countries as shipping from Finland is deemed demanding or that 
container shipping lines would find the market too problematic compared with the amount 
of profit gained that they will stop offering services to and from Finnish ports. Mr. Sievers 
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(Port Of HaminaKotka) is worried about the overall declining environment in traditional 
Finnish export product markets. 
 
Mr. Antikainen (Finnish Transport Agency), Mrs. Nietola (FFIF) and Mr. Raappana 
discuss the future environmental legislation. New legislations such as the European 
Union’s sulphur directive which limits sulphur emissions from commercial shipping to 
0,1 percent, in a zone that extends from the English Channel to the Baltic Sea will push 
the logistics costs up and deteriorate Finnish competitiveness. Mrs. Nietola (FFIF) 
accepts the possibility of new environmental legislation but feels the new laws should 
apply all, not only a restricted area like the European Union’s sulphur directive. Mr. 
Raappana (Unifeeder) agrees with Mrs. Nietola (FFIF) and he finds the positive aspect 
that the new legislations will force the technology to develop faster.  
 
Mrs. Tiittanen (Kuehne + Nagel) mentions stevedores strike as a risk for the Finnish 
export. 
 
Russia signed in May a $400 billion energy deal with China, its second-largest trade 
partner. Chinese government highlights the growing economic cooperation between the 
two countries. According to Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade the share of traffic 
through Far East basin ports will increase from the current 23 percent to between 35 
percent and 40 percent by 2020. About 60 percent of Russian container volume flows 
through Saint Petersburg and other Northwest Basin ports. $100 million expansion of 
Russian port of Zarubino should be completed in 2018. Russia is currently investing in 
the Far East basin ports such as Vladivostok and Vostochny, aiming at transferring parts 
of the container flow thru those ports instead of the Baltic basin ports e.g. Saint Petersburg 
or HaminaKotka. Mr. Tonny Lin, Vice General Manager at Ningbo Renfeng International 
Freight Forwarding Co. Ltd., tells me the transit-time from Ningbo-Vladivostok is 
approximately ten to twelve days via direct call service. The transit-time from 
Vladivostok to Moscow by full rail service is about 15-18 days and is subject to the 
container waiting time at Vladivostok rail station and transshipment customs declaration 
process. The transit-time from Ningbo to HaminaKotka is approximately 40 days with 
container shipping lines and the trucking from HaminaKotka to Moscow is three to four 
days. Thus the route via Far East basin ports is ten to fifteen days faster than via Baltic 
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basin ports. When asked about the freight level on the two different routes Mr. Lin 
explains that the freight on the route via Far East basin ports is more stable, it is adjusted 
only according to rail capacity. Past years the sea freight for cargo shipped via Baltic 
basin ports have changed monthly if not weekly. The trucking fee from Baltic basin ports 
to Moscow is stable with the exception of fuel cost. The most cost effective route changes 
according to the sea freight. Mr. Lin chooses the routing based on the Russian import 
customer’s decision which is based on total transportation cost and the cost for import 
duty and value added tax. According to Mr. Lin also the customs conditions at 
Vladivostok, the required transit time and the availability of railcars affect the routing 
decision. Mr. Lin stresses that the Russian customers in general are mostly interested in 
the transportation cost and the cost for import duty and value added tax. Some Russian 
inland locations and cities in Siberia require the use of rail service and in such cases the 
Far East basin ports are favored. Mr. Lin describes how the Chinese government is 
pushing the “One Belt, One Road” thinking and the rail links from China to Central Asia, 
Russia, Poland and Germany.  
 
China first announced the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative in 2013. The OBOR 
has two key modules: New Silk Road Economic Belt that links China and Europe, through 
Central and Western Asia and Maritime Silk Road that will connect China and Southeast 
Asian countries, Africa and Europe. Since 2013 China has committed money into the new 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Silk Road Fund (NSRF) and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as bilateral arrangements with 
countries. These investments, loans, and grants will be spread to create a network of 
infrastructure — including roads and rail lines, energy pipelines, power stations, and 
coastal ports — that is envisioned to extend west to Europe via the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, and downwards into Southeast Asia via the Maritime Silk Road. Besides its political 
objectives, OBOR brings a strategic focus to the government’s “go out” initiative, which 
encourages Chinese firms to go abroad in search of new markets or investment 
opportunities. The OBOR push is being led from the highest levels of the government, 
and involvement will run across several ministries. Its initial stated emphasis will be on 
regional connectivity projects. OBOR will cover nearly two-thirds of the world’s 
population and one-third of global GDP.  (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2015) 
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3.6 Emerging risks in a matrix 
 
 
Figure 20. Emerging risks entered into a risk matrix 
Mr. Enberg (Maersk) feels the risk of Finnish forestry industry moving production abroad 
is possible and would cause damage as the export volumes out of Finland would decrease. 
He feels some ten to twenty percent of the production might move, but points out that the 
softwood that grows in the Nordics and Canada is required to make long fiber cellulose 
which in turn is essential to make durable paper and cardboard. Mr. Enberg explains it is 
unlikely the forest industry would completely re-locate closer to the market since it would 
mean shipping raw material instead of processed products.  
 
The risk of container shipping lines finding the Finnish market too challenging or 
unprofitable and retreat is by Mr. Enberg (Maersk) remote and the consequences 
catastrophic. It would mean the Maersk Finland office would be shut down and an entire 
shipment option would be lost to the Finnish industry. One of Mr. Enberg’s tasks is to 
negotiate with the shipping line what is a freight level that will keep the shipping line 
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Moderate Acceptable - use the ALARP principle and consider further analysis
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II. Container shipping lines would find the market too challenging / unprofitable and stops calls
III. Future environmental legislation
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V. Traffic through Far East basin ports instead of Northwest Basin ports, One Belt One Road initiative
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accepting Finnish cargo onboard. “Let’s say the export freight level from Finland is on a 
lower level than from Bremerhaven, which is a hub port it would be very challenging to 
convince the shipping line to accept the Finnish cargo onboard a vessel.” says Mr. Enberg 
(Maersk). What he is referring to is that all Finnish ports are out ports, served by feeder 
vessels so the freight from Finland should be higher than from European hub ports 
especially if the container shipping line has to first empty position the container to 
Finland.  
 
Future environmental legislation is according to Mr. Enberg (Maersk) occasional or fairly 
normal and causes minor damage. He feels the legislation is inevitable today’s world and 
all parties will adapt one way or another.  
 
Mr. Enberg (Maersk) says stevedoring strikes are occasional and causes major damage. 
The costs of the strikes are dire. If Finland's foreign export proceeds are distributed evenly 
throughout the year it's about 100 million euros a day so that is how much a day’s 
stevedoring strike could cost. 
 
Traffic through Far East basin ports instead of Northwest Basin ports and the Chinese 
initiative “One Belt One Road” are by Mr. Enberg (Maersk) improbable to occur and the 
damage is minor. He is a firm believer in that cargo is like water and will find its natural 
way passage where costs and resistance is the least. For example the existing rail links 
between China and Europe do not have the capacity to compete with ocean shipping.  
 
 
4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the findings of the study and the results to the research 
questions. Furthermore, it presents recommendations for the various parties involved. 
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4.2 Summary 
 (i) Find and analyze reasons to the shortage of containers in Finland 
The study found that the availability of export containers in Finland had experienced a 
great dip in the second quarter 2015. The key reason to the absence of export containers 
is the decay of import volumes to Russia. Before 2015 Finland enjoyed a steady flow of 
empty containers from the port of Saint Petersburg to cover the imbalance between export 
and import. It might be that Russian container flows are going thru a revolution which 
could mean there will no longer be empty containers in Saint Petersburg port to be moved 
to Finland. In such a situation Finland would go back to the old normal situation from pre 
1990’s when most of the containers where brought in empty from hub ports in Europe 
(e.g. Germany). The container shipping industry is going thru a trough stage in the 
shipping cycle (Figure 5 p. 15) when there is surplus of shipping capacity and very low 
freight rates. The freights are further driven down by the shipping lines themselves 
competing for market share in a stagnating market. When a big shipping line’s market 
share is low the vessel utilization is low and the slot costs surge. In an industry that is 
currently driven by cost savings it is not an option that is well looked upon. Another 
reason for shortage of export containers was that the container shipping lines had at the 
time moved large amounts of empty containers from European base ports to Far East base 
ports in order to caterer for customer’s yearly peaks season needs. However in 2015 there 
was no peak season around the Chinese New Year and so there was a delay before empty 
containers were available again in European base ports.  
 
(ii) Propose a solution to the situation  
Container shipping lines can bring empty containers from other European ports as long 
as there are containers available in the ports and the freight the Finnish shippers are 
willing to pay is on a level that is acceptable for shipping lines. Alternatively shippers can 
truck or ship cargo to European base ports and do the stuffing there assuming there are 
containers available. For large exporters like the forestry industry there is the alternative 
of using break bulk vessels given that the correct kind is available. The containerized 
mode of shipment from a Finnish port to destination port is the most cost effective mode. 
Changing the supply chain structure is a costly solution. It would require further research 
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and calculations to find out the exact costs of each mode of transport to be able to compare 
them.  
 
(iii) Raise awareness of other emerging risks 
Five future emerging risks for container shipments to and from Finland were identified: 
 Forestry industry would move their production to other countries 
 Container shipping lines would find the market too challenging / unprofitable and 
stops calls 
 Future environmental legislation 
 Stevedoring strikes 
 Traffic through Far East basin ports instead of Northwest Basin ports, One Belt 
One Road initiative 
4.3 Recommendations 
The author of the thesis urges shippers in Finland to be aware of the changes in the 
shipping market. Large exporters have their own transport departments and aim to 
decrease transportation costs. However, the author finds the shippers should be careful 
not to push freights so low that the shipping lines find it unattractive to deliver empty 
containers to Finland and allow laden containers on board ships. Shippers can choose to 
use the other service provider, as illustrated in Stopford’s model (Figure 4, p 15), such as 
break bulk, RoRo or LoLo. The author deems altering the supply chain as a complicated 
change management project. 
 
On the other side the author recommends the container shipping lines to actively inform 
their customers of changing circumstances. In the author’s experience customers actually 
appreciate if the news, even bad ones, are delivered upfront. 
 
The author recommends container lines to bring in empty containers to Finland in order 
to cater for export customer needs until and if the Russian import volumes return. Figure 
17 (p 39) shows how all ports except Hamburg and Bremerhaven are showing a notable 
decrease of empty containers out which leads to the conclusion that there are not so many 
empty containers available to be moved to Finland in the other nearby ports. Since 
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Hamburg and Bremerhaven are two of the main transshipments ports for cargo in and out 
of Finland it is logical to bring in empty containers to Finland from them. Perhaps 
satisfactory cost structures can be found thru economies of scale by using larger feeder 
vessels between Germany and Finland in order to reduce the slot cost like demonstrated 
in Figure 10 (p 25). 
 
One solution the author finds, to increase available export containers, is to increase import 
volumes to Finland. The import flow to the Finnish market has been quite stable according 
to Mr. Enberg and the European Commission’s economic forecast do not promise a rapid 
economic growth that would increase the import volumes. The author recommends that 
the sales departments of the container shipping lines would purchase or look at the free 
of charge import statistics to see if there is any cargo that can be shifted from alternative 
transportation modes to containers. For instance some raw materials that are shipped 
break bulk or bulk or European cargo that is trucked to Finland today. 
 
Some unprecedented events affecting the export container availability in Finland, have 
taken place in 2015: Russian export volumes have surpassed the import volumes and the 
westbound freights on the Far East – North Europe trade have plummeted so that the 
export and import freights were on level in June. The author recommends the container 
shipping lines to withdraw capacity and increase the freights. Increased freights would 
leave more profits and room to include sudden additional charges in the freight without 
the customer noticing. However, as Notteboom describes container shipping market 
regularly faces long periods of vessel oversupply and rate erosion and that shipping lines 
are reluctant to withdraw capacity in case a competitor would gain more from the rate 
restoration. Maersk Line is investing USD 15 billion in new-buildings, retrofitting, 
containers and other equipment perhaps aiming at pushing all but the largest carriers out 
of business. The author remembers discussions about small and medium sized shipping 
lines exiting the market since the slump in volumes in 2009. Yet only three mergers and 
acquisitions have taken place among the top 20 carriers in the past ten years.  
 
The Finnish Maritime Administration was in 2010 moved to be a part of the Finnish 
Transport agency and Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi. The author notes that in a 
country where about 80 percent of the Finnish foreign trade takes place by sea there is no 
53 
 
maritime national board. The European Union’s sulphur directive was widely covered by 
the press in 2012 and it was argued that it should had been stopped. In such situations and 
the one now at hand with a reduced container flow the author would see it beneficial to 
have a joint promotion of interests for shipping lines calling Finland. Such an organization 
could also discuss with the correct parties the unsatisfactory cargo services offered by the 
state owned Railway Company VR. Currently there is an intense discussion about 
improving the Finnish competitiveness and the author feels some cost-efficiency could 
be found through reducing the operating ports and improving the cargo services on rail.  
5 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis is to find and analyze reasons to the shortage of export containers 
in Finland. The research gives a detailed insight to the current export container situation 
in Finland and provides explanation what events led to it. Similar researches where 
availability of export containers in Finland is discussed have been written, but the author 
of the thesis could not find any from recent years. For instance “Seaborne container 
transports in Finland” by Venäläinen is from 2008. Parts of the findings in chapter three 
were used as background information for a presentation Mr. Enberg (Maersk) delivered 
at the 19th Helsinki Port and Logistics Day event  and for a presentation Mr. Matti 
Toivanen, MD Kuehne + Nagel Finland held at the local chamber of commerce regarding 
the container situation. The aim of this thesis is to answer the question “Why so few 
containers?”. The research objectives are:  
(i) find and analyze reasons to the shortage of containers in Finland 
(ii) propose a solution to the situation  
(iii) raise awareness of other emerging risks  
The research is an action research where the primary source of information was a series 
of seven interviews with professionals working in or closely related to the container 
shipping industry. Secondary sources include online articles, database and books. The 
theoretical part in chapter two discusses how the market influences the shipping industry 
and what risk mitigation actions the shipping industry has taken in order to run a 
successful business.  
 
The main findings were: 
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- There had been a severe shortage of export containers in Finland in the second 
quarter 2015, but the situation had improved by September. The main reason was 
the plummeting Russian imports. A secondary reason was the lack of peak season 
before and after the Chinese New year.  
- The most reliable way to solve the lack of containers is to position empty units to 
Finland from other nearby ports. 
- Five emerging risks were identified. The probability of them happening varies 
from improbable to occasional and the consequences from minor damage to 
catastrophic. 
 
The following recommendations for future research directions were identified during the 
study process:  
- The challenges in using break bulk shipments: finding correct ships, changing the 
sender’s and receiver’s supply chain, finding cargo westbound 
- Which is cost saving? To change the supply chain structure for large exporters 
like the forestry industry or to pay for the empty positioning of containers to 
Finland? 
- Updating the Finnish state Railroad Company VR’s services to match customer’s 
needs.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Interview details 
 
 Date: 4th June 2015 
Location: Maersk Finland office, Helsinki, Finland 
Length: 41m58s  
Interviewee: Mr. Tapio Mattila, Senior Vice President Marketing and Sales at 
Steveco 
Interviewer: Virve Hyytiäinen 
 Date: 2nd June 2015 
Mr. Tommi Sievers, Sales and Marketing Manager at Port Of HaminaKotka Ltd 
Reply by e-mail 
 Date: 10th June 2015 
Location: Finnish Transport Agency’s office, Helsinki, Finland 
Length: 31m32s  
Interviewee: Mr. Taneli Antikainen, Senior Transport Economist at the Finnish 
Transport Agency 
Interviewer: Virve Hyytiäinen 
 Date: 1st July 2015 
Location: Finnish Forest Industries Federation office, Helsinki, Finland 
Length: 60m 1s  
Interviewee:  Mrs. Outi Nietola, Logistics Manager at Finnish Forest Industries 
Federation 
Interviewer: Virve Hyytiäinen 
 Date: 28th July 2015 
Location: Unifeeder Finland office, Helsinki, Finland 
Length: 10m 47s  
 Interviewee:  Mr. Janne Raappana, General Manager of Sales for Finland and 
Baltics at Unifeeder A/S 
Interviewer: Virve Hyytiäinen  
 Date: 19th August 2015 
Location: Kuehne + Nagel office, Helsinki, Finland 
Length: 41m58s  
Interviewee: Mrs. Reetta Tiittanen, Sea freight Manager at Kuehne + Nagel 
Finland 
Interviewer: Virve Hyytiäinen 
 Date: 8th September 2015 
Location: Maersk Finland office, Helsinki, Finland 
Length: 45m 09s  
Interviewee:  Mr. Michael Enberg, Managing Director at Maersk Finland Oy 
Interviewer: Virve Hyytiäinen 
 
